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Rick Rule on Gold, Copper, Uranium and the Coming Hard Asset Rotation

Interview • 2026-05-18
Creator
Metals and Miners
Title
RICK RULE | Gold stocks relative to gold prices are at attractive levels right now!
Transcript Date
2026-05-18
Summary
Rick Rule, founder of Rule Investment Media and one of the most respected natural resource investors of the past half century, joins host Gary Bow on Metals and Miners for a wide-ranging conversation on macro conditions, monetary policy, and commodity markets. Rule argues that the US dollar is on a trajectory to lose 75% of its remaining purchasing power over the next decade -- a repeat of the 1970s -- making gold, gold equities, uranium, and long-duration copper a core strategic allocation for any serious investor. He addresses the incoming Fed chair Kevin Worsh, the ballooning federal deficit, rising long-term interest rates, and why he views the market's near-term caution about gold as misreading the historical record. Rule distinguishes between savers who need physical gold and investors willing to do the work in gold equities, while issuing a sobering structural warning about copper supply deficits that no amount of exploration can solve in time.
Key Points
Quotable Moments
Quotable moments are auto-generated from the transcript. Speaker attribution and quote accuracy should be verified against the original source before republishing or sharing.
Rick Rule
"Volatility is noise, not music. Structure your life so that you take advantage of volatility rather than being taken advantage of by volatility."
Why it works: self-contained, actionable, and captures Rule's entire positioning philosophy in two sentences -- usable as a standalone post or clip opener.
Rick Rule
"The 10-year Treasury isn't paying you five. It's costing you five."
Why it works: punchy reversal that reframes the yield conversation entirely; lands immediately without context and will stop the scroll.
Rick Rule
"If you and I start looking for copper today, we impact copper supplies 18 years from now. And we have five years to impact it. It ain't going to happen."
Why it works: the gap between 18 years and five years makes the structural deficit argument visceral; no chart required.
Rick Rule
"This isn't a bullish one or two year type of environment. This is a bullish for possibly 10 year type of environment. And those are the time frames you actually make money in."
Why it works: directly challenges the short-term trading mindset of most retail investors while stating the bull case with authority.
Concepts and Ideas
Core Framework: Dollar Debasement and Hard Asset Positioning
The 75% Purchasing Power Loss Thesis
Rule's central macro call is that the US dollar will lose 75% of its remaining purchasing power over the next 10 years. He anchors this in historical precedent: the Office of Management and Budget documented a 75% loss of dollar purchasing power during the 1970s. A $1,000 basket of goods today becomes a $4,000 basket a decade from now under this scenario.
Real Interest Rates Are Deeply Negative
Rule argues that official CPI understates inflation, which he estimates at 8 to 10% annually. At a 10-year Treasury yield of roughly 4.6%, holders of Treasuries are effectively losing approximately 5% per year in real terms -- they are paying the government to hold their money, not being compensated. This is the same condition that drove gold 26-fold in the 1970s.
Gold Stocks Are Cheap Relative to Gold
Rule applies the Buffett framework -- buy something great at a fair price -- to gold equities. He views the underlying commodity as a great long-term bet given dollar debasement, and current gold stock valuations relative to the gold price as fair rather than stretched. The sector represents only 0.5% of US savings, down from a 2% four-decade mean, suggesting dramatic underallocation.
Liquidity as an Option Premium
Rule deliberately maintains substantial cash and liquid assets despite the 4% annual real cost. He frames this as purchasing an option on future distress: in 1987 he lacked liquidity and missed the opportunity; in 2008 he had it and 2009 became the best investment year of his career. The cost of carrying liquidity is an insurance premium, not dead weight.
Practical Principles: Commodity Market Structure
Deferred Sustaining Capital: The Oil and Copper Problem
The oil industry has been deferring over a billion dollars a day in sustaining capital investment. The copper industry has underinvested for 30 years. Unlike oil, copper cannot be substituted or stockpiled easily, and the lead time from exploration start to first production is 18 years. Rule sees the capital deferral problem in both commodities as creating inevitable supply shortfalls priced into the future, not the present.
Copper's $150-250 Billion Capital Gap
A Wood McKenzie study of the world's largest copper producers found they need to invest between $150 and $250 billion in constant 2025 dollars just to maintain current supply levels -- which are already at a deficit. The industry has line of sight on only about half that capital. Meanwhile, copper demand excluding data centers is growing at 2% compounded annually, making the deficit larger over time regardless of investment decisions made today.
Uranium: Inevitable, Not Imminent
Rule distinguishes between certainty of direction and certainty of timing. Nuclear energy expansion driven by energy security concerns (echoing the post-Arab oil embargo construction of the French and Japanese nuclear fleets) is, in his view, inevitable. The shift in uranium markets from spot to term contracts allows both utilities and producers to lock in long-term supply and price, enabling the financing of new mines and plants on a 20-year horizon.
The Royalty and Streaming Cycle Is Just Beginning
Contrary to Wall Street's narrative that the best royalty and streaming deals are behind the sector, Rule argues the opposite. The Wheaton Precious Metals and BHP $4.2 billion deal -- where a smaller company financed a much larger one -- signals that major miners will increasingly need royalty and streaming capital to fund development. The sector has no single company large enough to meet coming demand; the capital will flow from royalty firms, private equity, and merchant banks collectively.
Adjacent Frameworks and Historical References
The 1970s as the Operative Parallel
Rule draws explicit parallels between now and the 1970s: dollar debasement, rising inflation that the official statistics undercount, an investor base conditioned by a prior era of stability (then post-WWII prosperity; now the 1982-2022 bull market), and rising interest rates that are mistakenly read as bearish for gold. He notes that inflation concerns began in 1967-68 but the American investor didn't act until 1972 -- a four- to five-year lag he sees repeating now.
Fossil Fuel Market Share Reality Check
Despite $7 to $11 trillion spent globally on alternative energy over 40 years, fossil fuels' global market share has moved from roughly 83% to 81%. Rule cites Bjorn Lomborg as a source for this framing. His point is not to dismiss renewables but to calibrate the pace of the energy transition against political assumptions, suggesting oil and gas production decline will be slower than policy narratives imply.
The Voter-Saver Dynamic
Rule frames monetary and fiscal policy through a structural lens: in a democracy, spenders vastly outnumber savers, so artificially low interest rates -- which transfer wealth from savers to spenders -- are a politically durable outcome regardless of who sits at the Federal Reserve. He uses the metaphor of four coyotes and a lamb voting on a lunch menu to illustrate why prudent monetary policy is structurally difficult to sustain democratically.
Implementation
Implementation steps are auto-generated from the transcript content and are provided for informational purposes only. They do not constitute professional advice of any kind. Always consult a qualified professional before acting on any information presented here.
1
Audit Your Dollar Exposure
Take stock of how much of your net worth is held in US dollar denominated assets: cash, bonds, dividend stocks, and real estate financed with fixed-rate debt. Rule's 75% purchasing power loss thesis means that a portfolio concentrated in fiat instruments is implicitly short hard assets. Map the exposure before making any moves, so you know what you are actually repositioning away from.
2
Build a Deliberate Liquidity Reserve
Rule keeps substantial cash despite the real cost, treating it as an option premium for distress opportunities. Determine what percentage of your portfolio should be held in cash or near-cash instruments, accept the real yield drag explicitly, and set trigger conditions under which you would deploy it. The 1987 lesson -- missing a generational opportunity because of illiquidity -- is a useful frame for sizing this reserve.
3
Add Physical Gold as a Monetary Base Layer
For most people, the most immediate actionable step from this interview is acquiring physical gold. Rule notes that precious metals represent only 0.5% of US savings versus a 2% historical mean. A reversion to mean -- let alone an overshoot -- would require substantial capital inflows. Physical gold is the foundation; it is not a trade and should not be sized as one.
4
Separate Saving in Gold from Investing in Gold Equities
Rule draws a clear line between gold as savings (accessible, liquid, held for monetary protection) and gold equities as investments (requiring research, risk tolerance, and ability to endure volatility). If you are not prepared to do the work to distinguish high-quality operators from capital-destroying juniors, stick to royalty and streaming companies like Franco-Nevada and Wheaton Precious Metals, or avoid the equities layer entirely.
5
Evaluate Uranium on a 5 to 10 Year Time Frame
Rule's uranium thesis is explicitly not a 2027 trade. If you are considering uranium exposure, calibrate your position sizing and exit expectations accordingly. The structural drivers -- energy security demand, the shift from spot to term contract markets, new reactor construction -- play out over a decade, not a quarter. Short-duration thinking in uranium is the wrong tool for this thesis.
6
Wait for a Liquidity Squeeze Before Adding Copper Equities
Rule is explicitly post-squeeze on copper. He sees current copper prices as elevated by conflict hoarding and excess inventory, and worries that a synchronized global recession could temporarily crush copper demand. The long-term structural case is arguably stronger for copper than any other metal, but the entry point matters. Use a potential deflationary episode to accumulate the highest-quality copper producers at distressed prices.
7
Understand What You Own Well Enough to Hold Through Volatility
Rule's fourth rule is simply to do the work. In practice, this means reading company financials, understanding reserve life and sustaining capital requirements, and having a thesis specific enough that a 30% drawdown in price does not change your conclusion about value. Without that foundation, volatility is experienced as risk rather than as the opportunity Rule says it actually is.
8
Submit Your Portfolio for Rick Rule's Free Ranking
Rule offers a free portfolio ranking service at ruleinvestmentmedia.com for natural resource investors. Submit your holdings and receive a 1 to 10 ranking with individual commentary. This is a direct, no-cost way to get Rule's perspective on the specific companies you hold -- a resource worth using before making any significant changes to a hard asset portfolio.
Transcript
This transcript was auto-generated and may contain errors in speaker attribution, transcription accuracy, or formatting. Long transcripts may be truncated due to processing limits. Confirm accuracy and completeness against the original source before referencing or republishing.
[00:00]

Rick Rule: Specifically, if the purchasing power of the dollar declines, as I believe by 75% over 10 years, I think that gold will maintain its nominal value, which means the gold price will do very well. If the gold price does very well, gold stocks relative to the gold price are already at attractive levels.

Gary Bow (Host): Welcome back to Metals and Miners. I'm your host, Gary Bow, and today we're digging into the volatile and rapidly changing world of markets, metals, and miners with Rick Rule, founder of Rule Investment Media, amongst his many current and past titles, and one of the greatest natural resource investors of our time. Rick, it's an honor to have you back on Metals and Miners. Welcome to the show.

Rick Rule: Always a pleasure to visit, Gary. Thank you for having me back.

Gary: Absolutely. All right, Rick, you've been one of the most successful investors in natural resources over the last half century. You have witnessed many cycles. Today the markets are rapidly changing, extremely volatile, and layered on top of all of that we have institutional changes taking place for the first time in over eight years as Kevin Worsh replaces Jerome Powell as Fed chair, with Powell remaining on as Fed governor. All of this is having and will have large effects on the markets, commodities, the purchasing power of the dollar, and portfolios moving forward. There's so much to discuss today. But before we do, what do you hope those tuning in will walk away with after hearing this conversation?

Rick Rule: I would say that to the extent that I've been successful and have any wisdom to impart, it boils down to maybe four things. Ignore the headlines. Pay attention to the background facts. The greatest wonder in financial markets is compounding, and compounding takes time. Volatility is noise, not music. Structure your life so that you take advantage of volatility rather than being taken advantage of by volatility. And do the work. Paying attention to headlines is for many people a substitution for understanding something about the value of their investments. And that's a really, really bad trade. If you distill what has worked for me, those are the lessons.

Gary: Fantastic. Okay. Later today, Kevin Worsh is going to be sworn in as the next chairman of the Federal Reserve. When he was chosen by President Trump, he shared a vision that the Fed needs to cut rates. The problem is that today on his first day as chairman, the market is pricing in a 64% probability that rates are going to be hiked by the end of the year instead of cut. 30-year rates are now the highest since George W. Bush was president. The 10-year is the highest since early March -- it's gone from sub-4% to about 4.6%. Are you expecting the Federal Reserve to have to hike rates this year? Do you expect the economy to tighten and maybe even contract?

Rick Rule: The market is doing the Fed's job, which is to say interest rates are rising because inflationary expectations are rising. Understand that artificially low interest rates distort the market, but more importantly they subsidize spenders at the expense of savers. You get what you encourage. Sadly, in our economy spenders are much more numerous than savers. And so in an election, of course the spenders vote to be subsidized at the expense of savers. It's as though four coyotes and a lamb got together for lunch and voted on the lunch menu. Guess what that menu consists of. What the market is doing, despite the best efforts of the Fed and the political class to lower near-term rates, is that the long-term rate is rising all by itself.

[05:00]

Rick Rule: I suspect that the political pressure exerted on the Fed and on the political class will cause the Fed to do as much as it can to lower rates, which I think is unfortunate, because I think it postpones and increases the scope of the problem.

Gary: Interesting. So you actually think they're going to go counter to what the markets are calling for? I think in the very near term there's a lot of faith in the dollar, and they may allow interest rates to stay stable for a little while. But to the extent that cracks appear in the credit market, and I think they will, and to the extent that the interest on the national and state debt becomes a problem, which it is, I think they're going to face insurmountable political pressure to cut interest rates. And to the extent that we experience some form of economic dislocation -- a liquidity-driven squeeze in markets, or a recession driven perhaps by higher energy prices or a decline in equity markets -- the policy response has always been quantitative easing, also known as counterfeiting, or artificially low interest rates. That has been the policy response for my entire 73 years on earth, with the exception of the Volcker era.

Gary: The budget deficit is on an annualized run rate of about $2.5 trillion right now. How much higher can rates go before the budget breaks? And do you expect the Fed to print in order to mitigate the pain on the yield curve or on the budget itself?

Rick Rule: The first thing to note is that the last mainstream politician I ever voted for was Ronald Reagan, who said he was going to reduce the size of government. That produced a wonderful book called The Triumph of Politics by David Stockman. I don't listen to what these guys say. They're lying when their lips are moving. So irrespective of what Worsh says, I think he has no scope to do what he's proclaiming. So I discount it. As to the impact of higher interest rates on the federal budget, it's going to be catastrophic. Literally catastrophic. Higher interest rates will do three hard things to the economy that sadly need to happen. First, they raise the cost of capital for companies, which reduces earnings per share and has a deleterious impact on equity prices. Second, higher risk-free interest rates provide competition for equities from bond markets and lower the relative value of dividends. Third, they increase the cost and restrict the availability of capital for everybody else, exacerbating what is already becoming an increasingly difficult time in private credit and below-investment-grade debt. There's nothing to be done about this, Gary. If you intervene in the near term, you make the problem worse in the intermediate term. Better to do what we did in 1980 -- take the pill, have two very, very hard years, purge the system, and rebuild from a more honest base. Sadly, that's not the American way.

[10:00]

Gary: So that's not your base case.

Rick Rule: I would be delighted to see it happen. It would be painful. But it's going to be painful either way.

Gary: It sounds to me like the more likely scenario is that they're going to do some type of yield curve control in order to tamp down rates and protect the budget from getting further out of control.

Rick Rule: Correct. Or rather, they're going to disguise the budget. A payment disguised is a payment postponed, which means you pay it back ultimately with interest. Really, what this is is a transfer of incumbrance from old folks like me to young folks like you. You've got to pay it.

Gary: All right. So clearly the tightening economy and current policies are near-term bearish for precious metals and miners. That said, isn't the larger backdrop we've been discussing ultimately bearish the US dollar and bullish precious metals, miners, and the whole hard asset class?

Rick Rule: Yes. Confidence is hard on gold. Gold is a bet on the deteriorating purchasing power of the US dollar. Higher interest rates in the near term are hard on gold until the market comes to realize that the reason for higher rates is fear of inflation -- which is good for gold. When people tell me the truism that higher interest rates are bad for gold, I say only for a period. During the decade of the 1970s, the 10-year rate rose from roughly 3.7% to 18%, and the gold price ran 26-fold. So when people tell me gold can't do well during rising interest rates, I wonder if I actually lived through the 70s. And I can assure you that I did. In the near term, which is increasingly the way people think, that has become a factoid -- believed to be true because it has been observed. But if you look at the underlying reasons for both phenomena, you understand that rising gold prices and rising nominal interest rates are not mutually exclusive.

Gary: Some people are comparing what's happening now to 2008, worried about a correlation of everything going to one and going down together. Others are saying it's more like 2000, with a rotation out of tech and into commodities and metals and miners. And further still, some are saying it's more like the 1970s, with the 2000s-style rotation plus a bout of stagflation mixed in. Now that we're getting deeper into this process, what does this feel like to you?

Rick Rule: I'm going to sound drunk, Gary, but: all of the above and none of the above. Each of those three crises shapes the response to this circumstance. But the problem has changed a bit. In the 1970s, we had a circumstance like today's but different in the sense that the net present value of unfunded entitlement liabilities relative to GDP is much higher now, and the national debt relative to GDP is much higher. That's bad. The good part is that as a consequence of technology, we get more economic advantage with less economic input -- we can afford to be dumber than we used to be able to be. The policy response to the two crises you mentioned -- and to 1987 -- was the same in each case: the voters cried "save me," and rather than dealing with the underlying problems of excessive social expenditure crowding out private investment, we answered by debasing the currency.

[15:02]

Rick Rule: There is likely a lot of room left to debase the US currency. My friend Doug Casey describes the US dollar as the worst currency on the planet, with the sole exception of all of the others. Since 1913, the US dollar has lost 97% of its purchasing power. How much more can it lose? Well, 100%. I believe, Gary, that over the next 10 years the US dollar loses 75% of its remaining 3% of purchasing power. That's what I believe happens. In the 1970s, the Office of Management and Budget documented that the US dollar lost 75% of its purchasing power. That meant what costs $1,000 today to buy a basket of goods and services will cost $4,000 ten years from now. You need to consider how expensive it will be to maintain your lifestyle, and you need to examine your savings and your income. Those of you who can remember the 1970s: past is prologue. Many people either can't or won't remember those lessons, and they need to.

Gary: All right, Rick. I'm going to describe the broader macro financial backdrop and I'd like your synopsis. Treasuries are net speculative short close to a record right now. Oil is net speculative long close to a record. Stock market breadth is at or near record lows. Stock market margin debt is at record highs, and money supply is at record highs and rising. It seems like a fragile, leveraged, and dangerous cocktail. What's your analysis?

Rick Rule: Yes, yes, and yes. Let's talk about oil. If we don't resolve the problem in the Gulf quickly, we're going to have a real problem. The oil prices you're seeing today are in anticipation of a shortage -- they reflect hoarding. We have lived since the beginning of the conflict on floating inventories and strategic reserves. In North America, we're going to have a price problem because we have to compete with foreign buyers for our supplies. But we aren't going to have an allocation problem -- we're going to have to pay for it, but we're going to have it. Other parts of the world are going to have a very different problem if this thing doesn't resolve itself, and they're going to have that problem quickly. If you begin to ration oil by price, you figure out what oil is worth as opposed to what it costs. That's going to be a shock: reduced economic activity because some people won't be able to get it, and money that would be used elsewhere in the economy gets diverted to energy. Your viewers need to understand that the oil price shock they've seen so far is in anticipation of rationing by price rather than the realization of it. If we see rationing by price, there's another shock coming.

[20:00]

Rick Rule: There are at least 200 cargos of floating inventory north of the Straits of Hormuz. It will take a little bit of time for it to reach places like Pakistan and Sri Lanka and Australia, but it'll get there, and the incentive to hoard will be reduced. Now, as an oil industry investor, you'll remember the last time we talked -- before the crisis -- I was incredibly bullish about oil for different reasons. I pointed out that the oil industry on a global basis was deferring over a billion dollars a day in sustaining capital investments, and that would impact the industry's ability to produce in 2029 or 2030. That situation has gotten worse very clearly. The Iranians aren't making sustaining capital investments because they don't have any money. Neither are they making them in the UAE or Kuwait or Saudi Arabia for similar reasons. On top of that, we have to repair and replace all of the facilities that were destroyed in the war. So the circumstance I described for 2029 is going to be worse, not better.

Gary: All we did was front-end the problem.

Rick Rule: What I'm trying to say is it's entirely likely that if peace broke out, the crude oil price would fall dramatically. Oil producer equities would also likely fall dramatically. And that would set up incredible bargains relative to the oil prices we'll see in 2029 and 2030. I hate to sound like an ogre profiting on other people's misery, but to the extent that others act foolishly with their money, I certainly won't. If you own oil equities, feel free to trade them if you think you're smarter than the market. If you don't, own them. You know, people have told me, Rick, you're so far up on your oil equities, you should sell them. I thought about it and said: why? If I sell, I pay capital gains tax, I shield myself from a downside I believe is temporary, and I have to buy back in to participate in an upside I think of as inevitable. If Exxon falls from 180 to 120, I'll probably feel fine because I bought it at 85 or 90.

[25:00]

Gary: I want to get your takeaway on something that commodities expert Jeff Curry recently wrote. He said the long end isn't a clean signal; the cleaner signal is the energy equity complex -- long-dated call options on undeveloped reserves. Exxon Mobil holds 14 years, Chevron holds 15 years. Equity prices integrate the entire forward strip. In a capacity-constrained world, those reserves are worth more, not less, but the equity market is pricing the opposite. Every oil CEO is warning that we exit this disruption with lasting supply problems, and the market is refusing to listen. The energy complex yields between 600 and 1,000 basis points in free cash flow above the S&P 500. A 1,000 basis point differential in free cash flow yields cannot persist. If oil breaks out, as we expect, something has to give. That's the revenge of the old economy -- metals, miners, energy, agriculture, and more. What's your read?

Rick Rule: Mr. Curry is probably better than me at deciphering the value of the Magnificent 7. When he compares the old economy to the new economy, there are implicit assumptions about the value of the new economy, and I don't make those assumptions. I don't know what they're worth. What I do know, because I'm from the oil industry originally, is that if you defer sustaining capital investments, you reduce your ability to produce. Global assumptions about energy prices still factor in the opinions of people like Greta Thunberg who predicted the end of oil in 2030 -- that's not going to occur. Production will decline and demand will increase, and you will ration access to production by price. In terms of commenting on Mr. Curry's arbitrage between the old economy and the new economy, I have to sit that out because I have no ability to value the new economy on an absolute basis. The oil industry over time is a no-brainer. Will the market share of fossil fuels decline? Yes, over time, as a consequence of technology. But not soon. It was drawn to my attention by Bjorn Lomborg among others that over the last 40 years, we've spent somewhere between $7 and $11 trillion on alternative energies and we've reduced the market share of fossil fuels from a high of 83% down to a low of 81%. I don't feel the threat.

[30:02]

Gary: Today information technology and communication services is roughly 43% of the S&P 500 while energy and materials is roughly 6%. Hard asset strategies have been starved of capital for a very long time. When tech rerates toward neutral in a higher yield environment, this rotation would be measured in trillions of dollars. A move from 43% concentration back to 25% -- which was the historical average -- represents roughly $10 trillion that would be looking for a new home. The only asset class big enough to absorb it is hard assets. Is this rotation unavoidable?

Rick Rule: It's predicated on your use of the word "when" with regards to the revaluation of tech, and I'm not prepared to offer any opinion because I don't think my opinion has value on that. I don't know what tech is worth. That rotation is predicated on "when." I like the resource sector on an isolated basis. I don't care about it in terms of a valuation metric that I don't trust. I look in a very absolute sense at the free cash flow the gold industry enjoys right now, the need for the gold industry to reinvest in itself to maintain -- never mind increase -- production, against the probability that gold revalues not against technology but rather against the US dollar. There I do have some confidence in my ability to predict. I feel real good about that. I'm not discounting what you say, Gary. I just don't want to hold myself out as being able to comment on the rebalancing because I don't understand half of the equation.

Gary: Okay. In the energy sector, focused on uranium: we have a situation where we need more energy because of AI demand, rising consumer status in the developing world, robotics, infrastructure, and military modernization. And now because of the war, those producers don't want to go through this again. They're looking for not just repair and replacement but redundancy. All of those importers stuck in the current situation want even more spare capacity than they had before. In other words, the world needs much more energy than it did just a couple of months ago. Based on all the base-load energies available and the capability for expansion, isn't the biggest beneficiary nuclear energy and uranium -- the only one that could really expand to meet this need?

Rick Rule: Yes. It's important to note this might not be a 2027 theme. The timing is uncertain, but this is a question where the answer begins with "when," not "if." This one is inevitable. It may not be imminent, but it's inevitable. I'm old enough to remember the construction of the French nuclear fleet and the Japanese nuclear fleet -- the fourth and third largest in the world respectively -- which occurred as a direct consequence of the Arab oil embargo. Both countries, both societies came to understand that they needed energy security, and the only fuel dense enough to give them that security was uranium. The Japanese prime minister said we can store enough uranium in one warehouse to power Japan for five years. There is no building on the planet that could house that much liquefied natural gas, that much oil, that much coal, let alone that much rain or wind.

[35:02]

Rick Rule: The combination of the need for energy security with the need for increased base-load power and the political preference for non-carbon generating base-load power -- combined with the change in the structure of the uranium market from reliance on the spot market to the term market -- means that consumers of uranium will be able to lock in enough supply to amortize the bonds used to finance new nuclear power plants, and producers will be able to lock in both volumes and prices 20 years out, which will enable them to secure capital to build these mines. The next 10 years in the uranium business will be unlike any other.

Gary: And isn't the projected supply deficit unlike what was going on in the 1970s? Wasn't there more abundance then versus today?

Rick Rule: In the 1970s we had latent supplies; what we experienced was demand growth that exceeded our near-term ability to produce. The uranium price ran up -- this is a horrible pun -- explosively in the 1970s, but from a very modest base. The wild card here, Gary, and I don't know how to quantify it, is that nobody really knows the level of above-ground finished inventories. Nobody knows. I've tried for 30 years to get to the bottom of it. I listened to the proceedings of the World Nuclear Association in London. There was one speaker who said the supply deficit is between 35 and 40 million pounds, and there's 350 million pounds of above-ground finished inventory, so the deficit isn't a problem. What that speaker doesn't take note of is that 82 million of those supposed 350 million pounds are owned by a SPAC -- and that's not supply, it's gone to supply heaven. When I juxtapose the various aspects of that market that are certain, the signs are just completely bullish.

Gary: This isn't a bullish one- or two-year environment, is it? This is a 10-year type of environment.

Rick Rule: Correct. And people need to know that those are the time frames where you actually make money. Four years, five years, 10 years -- those are the time frames. That's not what people want. People want a three-month triple. But that's very seldom on offer, particularly with any certainty.

[40:02]

Gary: All right. Back to the backdrop we're seeing today. I want to compare it to 2022 for a moment. As the Fed was hiking rates back then, inflation was rising and outpacing rate hikes. Gold trended downward for the better part of 2022 until inflation started coming down and real interest rates started rising later in the year. Right now we're seeing inflation rising, gold falling, real interest rates falling, and the prospect of a Fed rate hike increasing. Are we setting up for a 2022 part two, which would then set the stage -- maybe near the end of the year or beginning of 2027 -- for the next big rally in precious metals?

Rick Rule: I have no idea. None whatsoever. What I believe is that real interest rates are sharply negative. I believe that what I would describe as inflation -- the deterioration of the purchasing power of the US dollar -- is running at between 8 and 10%, rather than what the "CP-lie" would have you believe. If you juxtapose 10% deterioration in the purchasing power of the US dollar, the 10-year Treasury isn't paying you five -- it's costing you five. It was that circumstance in the decade of the 1970s that propelled the gold price. It's important to note that concern about inflation began in 1967 or 1968. The American investor didn't take note of that until 1972. At that point, the US economy had come off what was described as the Camelot era -- the period from 1946 to 1967-68 -- with everything going very well. The consequence was that investor decisions were predicated on their experience in the past, which had been great. The parallels between then and now are staggering. The assumptions we make about the future are formed by our experience in the period 1982 to 2022 -- the most benign economic climate known to humankind. And so confidence, despite rising prices, despite the political response to rising shelter prices, rising food prices, rising energy prices, the investor response is predicated on those lessons. I watched this happen before, albeit as a very young man, from 1967 to 1972. When the assumptions change, response changes -- and it changes very, very rapidly.

Gary: Are you considering any catalyst to this type of change?

Rick Rule: The catalyst is math. If there are 400 million players in the US economy, they're not going to turn on a dime. There's no overnight reaction worth trading. It's just going to be simple math. The voter and the investor are going to be overwhelmed by reality over time.

[43:00]

Gary: All right, Rick, where do you see the greatest investment opportunities right now in all of this chaos and change and volatility?

Rick Rule: For most people, gold. But I think you need to do a few things most people don't want to do. First, despite the fact you lose money doing it, you have to maintain liquidity. That's really expensive. My savings -- and they're substantial -- are costing me probably 4% in purchasing power annually. I consider that negative yield to be an option premium on having the liquidity available to take advantage of a liquidity squeeze. While I'm not suggesting a liquidity squeeze is necessarily imminent, I think it's inevitable. I remember back to 1987. I didn't have liquidity so I couldn't take advantage of the circumstance. In 2008, I had plenty, and the consequence was that 2009 was the best investment year of my career. So you have to have liquidity despite the fact it's expensive. And you have to have gold. You need to decide for yourself whether gold constitutes liquidity for you. I've learned that I can sell gold if something more attractive comes along. But I know some gold bugs who can't bring themselves to sell gold in any circumstance -- so for them, they have to regard it as an illiquid asset class. But a thousand years or more of recorded history have told us that gold protects us from the deteriorating purchasing power of fiat instruments, particularly when interest rates are negative.

Rick Rule: I read a JP Morgan Chase statistic that precious metals and precious metals related equity constitutes half of 1% of the total savings and investment assets in the United States. They suggest that's down from a four-decade mean of 2%. I'm not saying we have to have mean reversion, but I'm not saying we won't overshoot the mean either. What I'm trying to say is that it's a very underowned asset class relative to what I see as the risks inherent in not owning it. In direct answer to your question, not for me -- because I've been saving in gold for 25 years -- but for most people, the most efficacious addition to their savings would be gold. And by the way, they should increase all of their liquidity, because I'm afraid -- not certain, but afraid -- it's going to come in handy. For people who are investors as opposed merely to savers, they should consider the highest-quality gold equities -- names like Franco-Nevada, Wheaton Precious Metals, and Agnico Eagle. For people willing to do the work, endure volatility, and embrace real risk, they need to speculate in the rest of the gold mining sector. For people who aren't willing to do the work, they should avoid that sector like the plague. There are wide variances in quality and wide variances in risk.

[47:00]

Gary: One last piece on the investment side. Do you like copper moving forward? Pre-liquidity squeeze or post?

Rick Rule: Post. I'm a little afraid of copper right now in terms of price. The world is awash in copper inventories. The copper traders are getting squeezed by high interest rates and the copper price is going up anyway -- that scares me. I also believe that if we have a synchronized global recession, which is not an illogical outcome of the oil price squeeze, demand for all things falls, including copper. Looking longer term, copper is an absolute no-brainer. We have underinvested in copper production for 30 years. Deferred investment in oil is negligible on a percentage basis compared to what's happened in copper. And no matter what we do, the maintenance of current levels of copper demand relative to our ability to supply that demand five years out means the nominal price of copper increases. I've been involved in the exploration business for 45 years, and I've learned an ugly truth: if you and I begin to explore a promising district now, it's probably 10 years before we understand the district well enough to make a discovery. Once we've made a discovery, it takes two or three years to delineate it, three or four years to permit it, two years to build it, and after we've built it, a year to shake it in. Which means if you and I start looking for copper today, we impact copper supplies 18 years from now. And we have five years to impact it. It ain't going to happen. The only way it can happen is a synchronized global depression. And if that's the case, your copper investments will be the least of your worries.

[50:02]

Gary: Another thing around copper that amazes me -- I was in London last year for mining week, which is an amazing thing to do. And I heard a Wood McKenzie paper where they had polled the biggest copper producers in the world. They said collectively that they have to invest between $150 and $250 billion in constant 2025 dollars -- not inflated dollars -- to maintain copper supplies at current levels. There are three problems with that. The first is that they have line of sight on about half that money -- they have to raise the rest. The second is that current copper supplies are already at a deficit. So only maintaining the current deficit requires $150 to $250 billion. And the third is that demand excluding data centers is growing at 2% compounded. The fact that you can't solve that problem with exploration, and the fact that the industry has to spend as much as $250 billion -- $100 billion of which it doesn't have -- to maintain current supplies which are at a deficit, and that doesn't take into account 2% compound growth... that spells opportunity for investors and trouble for the world. And quite frankly, with those three large IPOs coming -- SpaceX, Anthropic, and OpenAI -- valued at between $4 and $5 trillion, there's a lot of money heading in that direction, making it even harder for the copper industry to acquire that $100 billion.

Rick Rule: And as a postnote: a substantial part of that money, to the extent it comes, is going to come from the royalty and streaming industry. It's important to note that Wall Street and Bay Street will tell you that the explosive growth period of the streaming business is behind us, that the big transactions are in the past -- and that's exactly wrong. The recent deal between Wheaton Precious Metals and BHP for $4.2 billion, where the minnow financed the whale, with higher multiples assigned to free cash flow from precious metals in a stream package relative to base metals revenues in a public company package, tells us that the biggest transactions that the royalty and streaming business have ever engaged in will occur in the future rather than the past. There are no companies big enough, frankly, to handle the demand. So that demand is going to have to be satisfied by royalty and streaming companies collectively, by private equity, by merchant banks. It's a tremendous opportunity that's coming, and it absolutely, positively, without a doubt, is going to happen.

[53:00]

Gary: That's exciting. All right. This has been a wonderful discussion with Rick Rule. Before we wrap up, I want to direct everyone interested in the metals and mining sector to dive into our Substack at metalsandminers.substack.com. When you join the growing community, you're going to receive a free report titled "If you don't own gold, you know neither history nor economics" -- a famous quote attributed to Ray Dalio. Please hit the like and subscribe button and leave a comment below the video. Rick, we're going to wrap up. Would you share a key takeaway for viewers and then let everybody know about your upcoming conference, how they can get a ticket or tune in, and how they can find you online?

Rick Rule: You find me easily at ruleinvestmentmedia.com. Go to that website, enter your natural resource portfolio, and I personally and for free will rank it 1 to 10 -- one being best, 10 being worst. I'll also comment on individual issues if I think my comments might have value. With regards to my symposium: we've been putting it on for 30 years. Unlike other people's symposiums, ours comes with a money-back guarantee. If you think for any reason that you didn't get your money's worth, I'll give you your money back. Nobody else does that. The live event is sold out, but you can live stream from the comfort of your own home at rules.com. We interview every exhibitor before the conference, which is available free at the Rule Investment Media website. When you attend, we give you four days of programming -- more than you could absorb -- and the conference is recorded, so you get access to the recordings for free. In 30 years of making the money-back guarantee, we've had to refund about one-tenth of 1% of the tuition charged. The symposium runs July 6 through 10. Live stream includes access to the recordings, which are very valuable, for a full year.

[55:01]

Gary: Wonderful. I will have the information up on screen. For those tuning in right now, head over to the description area -- you'll find links to everything Rick just mentioned. I've been to the symposium for three years. It's wonderful. The networking is incredible, although it's sold out for in-person this year. But the knowledge base and content is overwhelming and critically timely. Rick, thank you so much for coming on to Metals and Miners once again, for being so generous with your time, analysis, and ideas. Always love spending the time with you. Look forward to having you back on sometime soon. And everybody else tuning in, thanks for watching.

AI Master Prompt
The AI prompt on this page is auto-generated from the transcript content and is intended to support further exploration of the topics, concepts, and conclusions discussed. It is provided for informational purposes only. The user is solely responsible for all outcomes resulting from its use.
Master Prompt
CONTEXT This chat is grounded in the investment philosophy of Rick Rule, one of the most experienced natural resource investors of the past half century. Rule's framework is built around a single, durable thesis: fiat currencies -- particularly the US dollar -- lose purchasing power over time through the political mechanism of debasing the currency to serve spenders at the expense of savers. His investment decisions flow from this thesis rather than from market timing, momentum, or short-term macro calls. Rule's current macro view, expressed in a May 2026 interview on Metals and Miners, is that the US dollar will lose 75% of its remaining purchasing power over the next 10 years, mirroring the Office of Management and Budget's documented 75% loss in the 1970s. He is not a macro trader -- he explicitly declines to time markets or value technology stocks. He is a deep fundamental investor in natural resources who buys what he understands and holds through volatility. His four operating principles are: (1) ignore the headlines, (2) pay attention to background facts, (3) respect compounding and give it time, and (4) do the work to understand what you own. He treats volatility as opportunity, not risk -- but only when backed by the understanding that comes from research. His current investment hierarchy for most people is: first, increase liquidity (even at a real cost, treating it as an option premium); second, hold physical gold as monetary savings; third, for investors willing to do the work, hold high-quality gold royalty and streaming equities (Franco-Nevada, Wheaton Precious Metals, Agnico Eagle); fourth, for those willing to speculate, explore the broader gold mining sector with rigorous single-company risk analysis. He is structurally bullish on uranium on a 5 to 10 year time frame, on copper post-liquidity squeeze on an 18-plus year supply logic, and on the royalty and streaming sector as the capital provider of last resort for the coming commodity capex cycle. KEY PRINCIPLES - Dollar debasement is a political inevitability in democracies where spenders outnumber savers; it cannot be stopped by personnel changes at the Federal Reserve. - Real interest rates are negative when measured against actual inflation (8 to 10% in Rule's estimate), not the CPI print; the 10-year Treasury is costing holders purchasing power, not compensating them. - Rising nominal interest rates are not structurally bearish for gold; the 1970s saw rates rise from 3.7% to 18% while gold advanced 26-fold. - Gold equities are cheap relative to the gold price right now; gold itself is a fair price for a great asset given the dollar debasement thesis. - Precious metals represent only 0.5% of US savings and investment assets versus a 2% four-decade mean -- the sector is deeply underowned. - Copper cannot be rescued by exploration; an 18-year lead time from discovery to production means only a global depression resolves the structural deficit. - The best royalty and streaming transactions have not happened yet; the capital demands of the coming commodity cycle will dwarf what has come before. - Liquidity is not idle capital -- it is an option on distress, and Rule's best investment year (2009) was funded by liquidity he held through 2008. WHAT THIS IS NOT This is not a trading framework. Rule explicitly refuses to time markets, predict short-term price moves, or value technology stocks. This prompt should not be used to generate buy or sell signals, predict near-term price targets, or compare hard assets to technology on a relative-value basis. Rule's framework operates on 5 to 10 year time horizons and is grounded in the relationship between monetary policy, currency debasement, and the purchasing power of real assets. It is not a macro trading system and should not be applied as one. HOW TO USE THIS CHAT 1. THESIS TESTING -- Challenge any assumption in this framework. Ask the AI to steelman the bull or bear case for gold, copper, uranium, or streaming equities based on Rule's stated logic, and then push back on it. 2. PORTFOLIO APPLICATION -- Describe your current portfolio or savings position and ask the AI to evaluate it through Rule's lens: How much dollar-denominated exposure do you have? What is your real liquidity position? What is your allocation to hard monetary assets relative to the historical mean? 3. CONCEPT DEEPENING -- Ask the AI to explain any specific concept from this interview in plain language: why royalty and streaming companies are positioned as capital providers of last resort, why the copper supply timeline cannot be compressed, or how the 1970s investor psychology parallels the present. 4. SCENARIO ANALYSIS -- Describe a market scenario (oil price shock, synchronized recession, Fed yield curve control, tech sector rerating) and ask how Rule's framework would respond to each. 5. IMPLEMENTATION PLANNING -- Ask for specific, sequenced steps to begin implementing Rule's framework in your own situation, calibrated to your risk tolerance, time horizon, and whether you identify as a saver, investor, or speculator in his terminology. 6. HISTORICAL PARALLEL MAPPING -- Use the AI to draw out the specific parallels between the 1967-1972 period and the present: what were the investor assumptions that were wrong then, and where are equivalent blind spots likely to exist today? TONE INSTRUCTION Respond in Rule's register: grounded, direct, evidence-anchored, no cheerleading, no hedging for the sake of politeness. Flag uncertainty honestly. Help me think clearly about the framework rather than just affirming it. [Paste your specific situation, portfolio question, or scenario here. Be as specific as possible -- the more concrete the input, the more useful the output.]